

DDI -
Sheldon

29 APR 1963

ER 63-3432

(This letter is in response to : TS 188261, 18 Feb; ER 63-1388, 8 Feb;
and ER 63-2878, 8 Apr)

25 April 1963

DDI-2067-63

The Honorable William C. Foster
Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Bill:

In this letter I will attempt to summarize my understanding of the results of our discussion on April 17th, and in doing so, answer your letter to me of February 8th and April 8th, and Adrian Fisher's letter of February 18th. The topics and ideas covered by these letters have, as indicated by you, been the subject of several discussions between representatives of our respective organizations.

First, I would like to repeat that the intelligence community, and most particularly CIA and DIA (as they are most directly concerned with your problems), desire to afford the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency all possible cooperation. We appreciate that our intelligence findings and analysis have an important bearing on your activities.

We feel it is not practical to place a permanent representative on your staff as no one man has knowledge of all the phases of the intelligence community's activities and, therefore, would be unable to properly serve your requirements. Likewise, it is not practical to set up a special unit in CIA to deal with ACDA's requirements as your requirements reach into most of CIA's divisions and, therefore, such a unit would have to include at least one representative from a great number of our departments or divisions.

In addition, it is my belief and this has been concurred in by Secretary Gilpatric, that there should be one focal point in the intelligence community as a liaison between the community and ACDA and that this point can best be set up in the Central Intelligence Agency.

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With this in mind, I am appointing a Liaison officer with appropriate staff assistance in CIA. I will so inform the United States Intelligence Board. He will be authorized to call upon all members of the community as well as all divisions and departments of CIA as appropriate to the extent necessary to meet your requirements.

The Liaison officer will be charged with the responsibility of serving your needs promptly so that delays which you have experienced in the past can be avoided. I think this arrangement should meet your requirements. The establishment of a USIB committee on ACDA matters as proposed in your letter presents difficulties because of your manifold needs. Your requirements do not present a parallel situation to JAEIC or GMAIC for they are involved in a very specific area of intelligence activity whereas your requirements range over a very broad field of intelligence reporting and analysis.

With respect to the ACDA representation on USIB committees such as JAEIC or GMAIC, or on USIB itself, it is my feeling that this would involve an extravagant waste of talent on your part for these committees are involved in a vast number of problems which are of no particular interest to ACDA. A better procedure is for ACDA to appear before the committees or the Board itself when matters of special interest to ACDA are up for consideration. This can be arranged by Mr. Hughes, Director of Intelligence and Research in the Department of State, who sits on USIB and has representatives on all of the committees and, therefore, can decide the circumstances under which ACDA representation should be called in. This, incidentally, is a procedure we follow in a great many departments of the Government that have a particular knowledge and special interest in a problem that may be brought before the Board or one of its committees.

With respect to the suggestions made in Mr. Fisher's letter that USIB make judgments on the range of probable error in estimates of Soviet capability, order of battle, quantity of military items, etc., I am at a loss to understand just what USIB could do along this line which would be constructive. What is asked by Mr. Fisher is that "...in addition to commenting on the range of probable error, the intelligence community might also...indicate their degree of confidence that the estimates are not grossly in error....ACDA will, in addition, require an estimate of range of error or total inventories as well."

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USIB regularly produces estimates of Soviet capabilities, order of battle, military inventories, etc., and these are under constant review and are revised from time to time as new dependable intelligence develops. In many instances, members of the community differ in these evaluations and it is my practice to set out the dissenting views in footnotes to the estimates. Some estimates are based on very hard intelligence. Others are arrived at by a synthesis of all available intelligence, a great deal of which cannot be evaluated as being "hard." The information on which the final conclusions are based is carefully studied by the intelligence community and the estimates reflect the degree of certainty which we have in our conclusions. Certainly no estimates are produced which are "grossly in error" nor is it practical to develop what is referred to as an "estimate of the probable error." When there is doubt, the estimate contains a range, or is otherwise qualified. When new information indicates that the range is not correct, a revised estimate is produced. I frankly do not see how we can go further.

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One point I must add is to emphasize the very great difficulty of developing the rate of production of military items, and in the case of some items, the total inventory. As an example, we feel we know with reasonable assurances the MRBM, IRBM, and ICBM launchers in the Soviet Union. Also, we know something of their military doctrine [REDACTED]

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However, we do not know the number of missiles in existence, nor the rate of production. The same is true of a great many other military items. Hence, it is not practical to proceed on any basis of destroying end items and then reaching a conclusion of what is left by the process of subtraction. What is necessary and appears to me indispensable if we are to pursue a safe course is an arrangement which would provide for the inspection of both the destroyed items and the remaining inventory.

With respect to the final question raised by Mr. Fisher, which is the extent to which intelligence can contribute to the inspection provisions of a treaty, I feel that this is a matter which should be very intensively studied by your staff and appropriate representatives of the intelligence community. Intelligence can make a real contribution in this area. Advantage should be taken of the potential of the intelligence community, not only with respect to gathering information but more particularly with regard to the intelligence processes used in arriving at a reasonable and dependable quantitative estimate.

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In studying this we must always look to the permanence of intelligence sources. Many of them are subject to compromise, and once compromised, as in the case of press leaks, they disappear. It seems to me that proven intelligence processes of analysis and estimates and the community's customary practice of drawing a reasonable conclusion from a synthesis of a wide spectrum of information is the most useful contribution the community can make to your problem.

I will be pleased to discuss this matter further with you after you have considered the points in this letter.

Sincerely,

/s/

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John A. McCone
Director

JAM/bd (19 Apr 63)

Coordinated with [REDACTED] Dr. Kent, Mr. Sheldon

Orig & ~~XX~~ Addressee 1 - General Carroll (General Carroll concurred on the above on 26 April)

1 - DCI Chrono

1 - DCI alpha

1 - ER with basic letters

① - DD/L--Mr. Sheldon

1 [REDACTED]

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18 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

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SUBJECT: Meeting with Mr. William Foster, 3:30 p.m., 17 April

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The purpose of the meeting was to discuss letters recently received from Mr. Foster. Mr. Foster, while praising the work of [redacted] and others, stated that many of ACDA's requirements from DIA and CIA have been delayed because of other priorities. He, therefore, had written to me asking for liaison man from CIA and he had an offer from [redacted] from Gilpatric asking the same from DIA. He also requested certain other matters discussed in this memorandum. My views were as follows:

1. ACDA should have one source which should be within CIA and should gather all information required by ACDA from the intelligence community, i.e., CIA and its many departments, DIA, NSA, AEC, etc.

2. No permanent man should be or would be assigned by CIA to the Disarmament Agency. However, a focal point of contact would be established within CIA and this party, (perhaps a staff, if necessary) would be instructed to expedite all of DIA's requirements. I would work out an appropriate arrangement with USIB members for coordination with ACDA information. I cautioned against direct contact by ACDA with USIB members as information received could very easily be misleading and representative of a unilateral department viewpoint. This would be most particularly true of Defense, since DIA were responsive to the JCS and the JCS had definite unanimous and stated opinions on all of ACDA's activities.

ACTION; An organizational plan should be worked out for the inter-relationship of the USIB members and ACDA, and discussed with McNamara and Gilpatric by McCone after preliminary discussions by Carter with General Carroll and General Fitch.

3. The Agency cannot establish a separate group to work on Disarmament matters, as Disarmament problems penetrate practically all divisions of intelligence community and CIA, and therefore a separate group would not be practical but the arrangements above would be practical.

4. ACDA was welcomed to participate in JAEIC, GMAIC, and USIB discussions of a matter of specific interest to ACDA and where ACDA's views are necessary. In McCone's opinion, the circumstances would be extremely rare. It was not practical for ACDA to have a permanent representative on any of the above bodies, nor was it practical for them to attend meetings except during the time when an item of ACDA's special interest was being discussed. This seemed to satisfy Mr. Foster.

5. There was only a most general discussion of the request of ACDA to give an estimate of the probable accuracy of estimates. I stated that any such estimate would be valueless for the reason that it was not possible to estimate the input of any item of ~~armament~~ armament into the Soviet system. I said, for instance, we knew quite well the number of IRBM and ICBM launch pads in existence or under construction. We did not now know, nor could we determine, the number of missiles and [REDACTED] nor did we know much about the rate of manufacture of missiles. The same was true of warheads, of tanks, of guns, and to a lesser extent, of airplanes. Therefore, I said to take any particular figure as the amount of equipment in existence and then to reduce this by 50% through agreement to destroy half of the existing resource might be entirely misleading. I said, and Foster agreed, that any such program of destruction of existing armament on a matching basis or under some formula should be accompanied by a reasonably adequate inspection of what is left. NOTE: This is a most important point and is a deviation from the most recent thinking of ACDA as explained to me by [REDACTED]

ACTION: The above policy should be discussed with appropriate people in CIA and elsewhere and followed by staff. Under no circumstances should we give the impression or fail to give ACDA full cooperation and prompt support. This is our responsibility to ACDA and all other agencies of Government. However, we should avoid becoming engaged in ACDA's policy-making processes and hence find ourselves a party to an agreed position without really having had a voice or a vote on the final policy position.

6. In the discussion it became apparent that a letter had gone forth in the last three or four days from the President and Macmillan to Khrushchev on the question of the test ban.

ACTION: We should see this letter. Mr. Cline should arrange accordingly.

